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SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S ORIGINIAL BRIEF 
Appellant's Brief at page 6 paragraph 6 contends that appellant quotes to two paragraphs 
of an affidavit by Francee JoUey that do not appear in the affidavit This affidavit was given to 
appellant's current counsel of record as part of a file maintained by appellant's trial counsel. It 
was believed by appellant's current counsel to be one of two affidavits submitted in opposition to 
Bank One's motion for summary judgment. Apparently, two affidavits by Francee Jolley exist, a 
longer version and a shorter version. The longer version contains two paragraphs that do not 
appear in the shorter version. Appellant has checked the record and has learned that the shorter 
version was the one that was submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court disregard the citation to the longer version in its Brief at page 10, and 
substitute in its stead the language of paragraph five of the shorter version, which reads: 
On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday, Mr. Herwit's account 
did not have sufficient funds to cover the check and the check was returned 
to Bank One on that day. To my knowledge, check #2526 has never been 
paid by First Security Bank. 
This language is substantially similar to the language cited in the longer version of the affidavit, and 
therefore should not cause appellee any prejudice.l For the Court's convenience, appellant has 
attached the longer version of Francee Jolley's affidavit as Addendum 1. The shorter version is 
also attached as Addendum 2. 
^ank One itself admits that this material does not prejudice its position, stating: "[e]ven if 
this material appeared in the affidavit of Francee Jolley it would be irrelevant." Appellee's Brief at 
23. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
PAULHERWIT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950714-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PAULHERWIT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous asides and gross misstatements that attempt to 
obfuscate the central issues on appeal. This Court should not be sidetracked by any of appellee's 
superfluous arguments. The merits of this case cry out to be heard, and this Court should properly 
focus its attention upon them. 
Appellee's assertion that Herwit's appeal is not based upon the record is groundless. This 
appeal is based squarely on the record and does not purport to raise any new issues that were not 
presented before the trial court. 
This Court should reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment because Bank 
One has failed to demonstrate the nonexistence of any genuine issues of material fact. Genuine 
2 
issues of material fact remain unresolved with respect to Bank One's claim as a holder in due 
course. These issues include (1) whether Bank One was on notice of any infirmities in appellant's 
check when deposited, and (2) whether Bank One acted in good faith in handling the check. Since 
these issues remain unresolved, the trial court's decision to allow Bank One to enforce appellant's 
check cannot be affirmed on this ground. Nor can the decision be affirmed on the ground that 
Bank One was a mere holder of the instrument. As a mere holder of the check, Bank One is 
subject to the same defenses that appellant has asserted against Aristocrat, the immediate transferor 
of the instrument. Appellant has asserted several valid defenses against Aristocrat. These defenses 
apply equally as well to Bank One. Appellant is entitled to have these defenses resolved at trial. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BANK ONE'S REBUTTAL TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS IS SUPERFLUOUS AND INTENDED TO OBFUSCATE 
THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL 
In its appellee brief, Bank One argues that appellant's Statement of Facts is not supported 
by the record. Appellee's Brief at 4. Appellee's assertions are groundless and obviously represent 
an attempt by appellee to obscure the merits of this appeal. Contrary to appellee's assertions, 
appellant's Statement of Facts is amply supported by the record, which can only be described as 
scanty at best. The following is submitted in an effort to answer "Appellee's Rebuttal To 
Appellant's Statement of Facts:" 
1. On or about May 19, 1995, Herwit drew check number 2526 on 
his account at First Security Bank for $9000. (Complaint, % 5; Answer, f 1). 
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The check was made payable to Aristocrat Travel and Cruises ("Aristocrat") 
and was meant to purchase ownership in the company. (Complaint, f 6; 
Answer, % 1; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 2). Herwit instructed Aristocrat to 
hold on to the check until Herwit had enough funds in his account to cover it. 
(Answer, f 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, % 3). Aristocrat was fully advised 
that the check would not clear until the closing on Herwit's condominium 
occurred. (Answer, f 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, K 3). However, on May 
25, 1995, an Aristocrat employee presented the check to Bank One for 
payment. (Complaint, f 7; Answer, ^ 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 4). 
2. Upon deposit of the check, Bank One credited Aristocrat's 
account for $9000, but did not allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw 
funds in the amount of the check. (Complaint, ^ 8; Answer, % 3; Affidavit of 
Paul Herwit, [^ 4; Affidavit of Deanne Freeman, ff 5-6). Bank One then 
sent the check along to First Security Bank ("First Security") for collection. 
(Complaint, ^ 14; Answer K 3; Affidavit of Deanne Freeman, f^ [ 4-6). On 
May 30,1995, without awaiting word from First Security as to whether 
Herwit's check had cleared, Bank One allowed Aristocrat to make a 
withdrawal in the amount of the check. (Answer, f^lf 4-5; Affidavit of 
Francee Jolley, Tffl 3-5; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ^ 5-7). That very same 
day, First Security refused to accept Herwit's check and refused to remit 
payment thereon. (Complaint, % 15; Answer, ^ 3). First Security stamped 
the instrument "RTM" (refer to maker) and returned it due to insufficient 
funds. (Complaint, ^ 15; Answer, |^ 3). 
3. Rather than immediately debiting $9000 from Aristocrat's 
account, Bank One continued to credit the account in the amount of Herwit's 
check. (Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ff 5-7). Over the next two months, the 
branch manager at Bank One telephoned Capital Assets to inquire into 
whether there had been a closing yet on Herwit's condo. (Answer, 1fl[ 4-5; 
Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ff 5-6). During this same time, the branch 
manager also phoned Herwit to ask about the closing. Herwit informed him 
that there had not yet been a closing and that he had no idea whether one 
would ever take place. (Answer, 1fl| 4-5; Herwit Affidavit, Iffl 5-6). 
4. Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. 
As a result, Bank One proceeded to enforce its claim to payment on the 
$9000 check against Herwit. (Complaint of Bank One). On August 23, 
1995, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court. 
(Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment). In support of its motion, 
Bank One contended that it was a holder in due course. Bank One also 
argued that if it was not a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the 
check and was thus entitled to enforce it against Herwit. (Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, pp. 8-10). Bank One's motion was opposed by two affidavits. 
(Affidavit of Paul Herwit; Affidavit of Francee Jolley). On September 28, 
1995, the circuit court issued an order granting Bank One's motion for 
summary judgment. (Order of September 28, 1995). Herwit appeals from 
this order. 
To be sure, appellant inadvertantly failed to cite to the record in compiling its initial 
Statement of Facts. This was an error in procedure, not in substance. This Court should not hold 
any minor deficiencies in that section against the appellant. Further, in order that the merits of this 
case might be heard, appellant has graciously afforded appellee with additional time within which 
to submit its brief. Appellee has apparently used this extra time to quibble over issues that tend 
only to obfuscate and raise a smokescreen of trivial procedural inadequacies. Appellee could have 
better used this time to insure that its own brief was submitted in perfect order. It did not. As a 
result, Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous deficiencies and gross misstatements, which 
overlap into substantive claims, to wit: 
1. Appellee's Brief contains a section entitled "Determinative Rules and Statutes," which 
cites to three rules of practice that are obviously not determinative of any of the issues on appeal 
See Appellee Brief at 2-3. Notably absent are any citations to the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code, which provisions are actually dispositive. 
2. The first six pages of Appellee's Brief are printed on only one side of the paper. The 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate printing on both sides. See Utah R. App. P. 27(b) 
("Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page ... ."). 
3. Appellee's Brief does not have a separate section reciting the applicable standard of 
review as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24; see 
also Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) (noting purpose of standard of review 
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requirement and stating that it should not be ignored by the parties). The only standard of review 
that can be gleaned from Appellee's Brief is that of "correctness." See Appellee's Brief at 1-2. 
That standard is hopelessly misleading and provides the Court with little guidance in resolving the 
issues in this appeal. The proper standard that this Court should apply was recited in Appellant's 
Brief at page 2. This standard can be summarized as follows: when reviewing an appeal from a 
summary judgment, this Court will inquire whether there is any genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party (appellee) is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. This Court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party (appellant) who 
opposed the motion for summary judgment Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233, 235 
(Utah 1993); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1989). 
4. Appellee's section entitled "Statement of the Issues Presented on Appeal" is unduly 
argumentative. See Appellee's Brief at 1-2. Appellee's first issue is particularly inappropriate, and 
also grossly misleading. Contrary to appellee's assertions, appellant's trial counsel submitted two 
affidavits in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. Although appellant has 
subsequently obtained new counsel, Appellant's Brief is predicated solely upon the record before 
the trial court and does not purport to raise any new issues for the first time on appeal. See infra 
Argument II. 
5. Appellee contends that Appellant's Brief refers to normal commercial banking practices 
that do not appear in the record. See Appellee Brief at 6, f 7. These references are supported by 
the following case citations and do not have to be made part of the record: Seinfeld v. Commercial 
Bank & Trust Co., 405 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla.App.3 Dist 1981) ("[Wjhile we might agree that, 
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standing alone, neither its indulgence of a chronically overdrawn depositor, nor its failure to 
observe the normal commercial practices of waiting for the checks to clear and determining 
the balance in Seinfeld's account before paying on them might not have been sufficient evidence 
of bad faith, the coexistence of all these factors raises at least a reasonable inference that the bank 
acted as precipitously and 'foolishly' as it did in order to attempt to shift to Seinfeld its own 
probable loss from Wolfson's machinations ...") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); National 
Savings & Trust Co. v. Park Corp.. 722 F.2d 1303, 1304 (6th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 
989 (1984) ("Neither employee followed the bank's standard procedure and check DATs 
account to ensure that it held sufficient funds to cover the check.") (emphasis added). 
6. In footnote 6 at page 26 in Appellee's Brief, Appellee argues that page 14 of 
Appellant's Brief cites to language from an old edition of the Utah Code. This allegation is simply 
untrue. APPELLANT'S BRIEF AT PAGE 14 CITES FIRST TO WHITE & SUMMERS AND 
THEN TO THE MOST RECENT EDITION OF THE UTAH CODE, THE 1995 SUPPLE-
MENT. That appellee's allegations are unfounded is further evidenced by the fact that 
Appellant's citation to § 70A-3-305 in its "Determinative Provisions" section matches exactly the 
citation that appears in footnote 6 of Appellee's Brief, except that APPELLEE MISQUOTES the 
last word of subsection (c)(1) as "transaction" rather than as "instrument." Compare Appellant's 
Brief at 4 with Appellee's Brief at 26 n.6. 
Appellee's Brief is thus filled with numerous asides and gross misstatements that attempt to 
mask the central issues in this case. Appellee's obfuscatory tactics are of no assistance to the 
Court in resolving any of the legitimate issues presented on appeal. Appellant therefore urges this 
Court to look beyond appellee's extraneous blustering and concentrate instead on the merits of this 
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case. See State v. Cook. 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (stating that inappropriate language of any 
kind does not assist courts in resolving main issues on appeal and has no place in an appellate 
brief). 
H. APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS BASED SQUARELY ON THE RECORD 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO 
RAISE ANY NEW ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Appellee consistently argues in its Brief that appellant has attempted to raise new 
arguments for the first time on appeal that were not raised before the trial court. Appellee's 
assertions are disingenuous. Contrary to appellee's claims, Herwit's appeal is based squarely on 
the record that appeared before the trial court. 
Appellee seems to be of the view that because appellant's trial counsel chose to oppose 
Bank One's motion for summary judgment with two affidavits and no accompanying 
memorandum, appellant is somehow now precluded from bringing an appeal based upon those 
affidavits. For example, appellee at page 12 of its brief argues: "Herwit failed to raise defenses by 
subsequent motion and failed to submit a memorandum containing any legal argument to the court 
in opposition to the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, Herwit has failed to 
preserve any issue for appeal." In support of this position, appellee cites to a litany of cases that 
stand for nothing more than the simple proposition that appellate courts will not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. Not a single case that appellee cites holds that a party is 
precluded from opposing a motion for summary judgment with a bare affidavit. Moreover, none 
of the cases hold that a party who has opposed a motion for summary judgment with an affidavit is 
thereafter precluded from appealing the court's decision. 
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Utah case law expressly provides that when a party files a motion for summary judgment 
supported by an affidavit, the opposing party must respond with a counter affidavit. See D & L 
Supply v, Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). Appellant has responded to Bank One's motion for 
summary judgment with two affidavits. This appeal is based squarely upon those affidavits, and 
does not purport to raise any new issues for the first time on appeal. Appellee's claim that "[h]ad 
Herwit, [sic] articulated his arguments before the trial court..., Bank One would have had an 
opportunity to respond thereto" is simply untenable. See Appellee Brief at 13. Appellee did have 
an opportunity to respond to appellant's arguments, and used that opportunity to submit a Reply 
Memorandum of September 14, 1995. Appellee's assertions thus lack merit, and this Court 
should properly disregard them. 
IE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST PRECLUDING 
BANK ONE'S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE HERWIT'S CHECK AS 
A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 
Point III of Appellee's Brief, which analyzes Bank One's status as a holder in due course, 
completely ignores appellant's arguments. In this section, appellee lists one fact after another that 
appellee contends is "undisputed." This is obviously an overstatement. Appellant directly disputes 
several facts that undercut Bank One's status as a holder in due course ("HDC"). First, appellant 
disputes the fact that Bank One took appellant's $9000 check without notice of any infirmities in 
the instrument. Second, appellant disputes the fact that Bank One's actions satisfy the test of 
"good faith." These facts are essential to the overriding issue of Bank One's status as an HDC. 
Under the applicable standard of review, appellant is entitled to have these facts construed in the 
light most favorable to his position. When this is done, the trial court's entry of summary 
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judgment in favor of Bank One cannot be affirmed on this ground. 
At page 21 of its Brief, Bank One argues that appellant has not asserted facts disputing 
Bank One's claim of lack of notice when it took appellant's check on May 26, 1995. Appellee 
argues: "Herwit's affidavits do not allege such a fact. Herwit appears to argue that Bank One is 
imputed with the knowledge of its depositor, or immediate prior transfer.... That entities 
knowledge cannot be imputed to Bank One." Appellee's Brief at 21. 
Appellee's assertions are disingenuous. From the beginning, appellant has asserted facts 
alleging that Bank One was on notice that appellant's check would not clear when deposited. For 
example, appellant's Answer states: "Aristocrat and [Bank One] were fully advised that the check 
would not clear." Answer, f 4 (attached hereto as Addendum 1). The Answer further provides: 
"In answering paragraph 12, denies that the check was cashed and affirmatively states that 
plaintiff was fully advised by both Aristocrat and defendant that the check would not clear." 
Answer, f 5 (emphasis added). Moreover, appellant's affidavit states: "From the date plaintiff 
[Bank One] received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff knew that the check would not 
clear defendant's bank." Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 6 (emphasis added). Herwit's affidavit 
goes on to state: "The check has never been honored and plaintiff was given notice many times by 
defendant that the check would not be honored and plaintiff also had notice from defendant's 
bank that the check would not be honored." Id. at f 7. 
These facts clearly place Bank One on notice of a defect in Herwit's check. As stated 
previously, appellant is entitled to have these facts construed in the light most favorable to his 
position. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 233, 235; English, 774 P.2d at 1155. That being the case, Bank 
One has not established a crucial element of HDC status: notice. Therefore, Bank One is not 
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entitled to enforce the instrument on that ground. 
There is a further reason why Bank One does not properly qualify as an HDC. This is 
because in taking the instrument, Bank One failed to act in "good faith." Appellee correctly notes 
in its brief that the proper definition of that term under the Utah Code is "honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995).2 However, a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One's actions in handling Herwit's check 
satisfy this standard. It is not enough to merely allege that Bank One's actions meet the test of 
good faith. As the party seeking the status of an HDC, Bank One has the affirmative duty of 
conclusively demonstrating that its actions meet this standard.3 This is a question properly 
2Appellant's Brief at page 11 mistakenly included the definition of "good faith" as that term 
is defined in Section 3-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code without providing the corresponding 
definition of that term under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. The first full paragraph on 
page 11 of Appellant's Brief should have read: 
Good faith is defined in § 70A-3-103 of the Utah Code. Section 
70A-3-103 provides: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned.'" This definition is derived from the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." UCC § 3-
103. Comment 4 to section 3-103 of the UCC provides clarification. It 
states, "[although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in 
context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than 
the care with which an act is performed." UCC § 3-103 cmt. 4. 
Appellant's Brief at page 3 should also be modified such that the definition of good faith 
provided under the Utah Code appears rather than the definition under the UCC. 
3It should be noted that Herwit is not, as appellee argues at page 17 of its brief, defining 
good faith as an "objective test." The Seinfeld case, which Herwit cites in his brief at pages 12 
and 16, makes perfectly clear that this is a subjective test. The Seinfeld court stated: "[T]he issue 
of both 'good faith' and lack of notice are based upon the bank's subjective knowledge and state 
of mind ..." 405 So.2d at 1041 (citations omitted). The court added: "It is true that the Florida 
version of the holder in due course provision of the U.C.C. does seem to protect the objectively 
stupid so long as he is subjectively pure of heart. But playing dumb is not the same as being 
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determined by the trier of fact See, e.g.. Community Bank v. Ell. 564 P.2d 685, 691 (Or. 1977) 
(en banc) ("The trial court did not err in refusing to withdraw the issue of Community's good faith 
from the jury's consideration.... The question is generally one for the jury unless only one 
inference from the jury is possible."); Northside Bank of Tampa v. Investors Acceptance Corp.. 
278 F.Supp. 191, 192 (W.D. Penn. 1968) ("[T]he elements constituting a holder in due course are 
questions of fact for the triers of fact to determine."). No findings of fact have been made in this 
case. If any doubt exists as to whether an entity qualifies as a holder in due course, such doubt 
must be resolved against the entry of summary judgment. Northside Bank. 278 F.Supp. at 192-
93; DuPont v. County Nat'l Bank. 369 So.2d 443, 443 (Fla.App. 3 Dist 1979). Labeling Bank 
One as a holder in due course would at this point be premature. Consequently, this Court should 
reverse the circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial. 
IV. BANK ONE'S STATUS AS A MERE "HOLDER" OF HERWIT'S 
CHECK IS SUBJECT TO DEFENSES THAT NEED TO BE 
RESOLVED AT TRIAL 
If Bank One fails to qualify as a holder in due course, its status as a mere holder of 
Herwit's check is subject to a number of defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305, -306 
(Supp. 1995). These defenses include violation of delivery for a special purpose, breach of an oral 
agreement to hold on to the check, and failure of consideration. See Appellant's Brief at 13-15. 
The appropriate resolution of these defenses is at trial. Accordingly, the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment appears to have been improvidently granted. 
dumb. A mere protestation of one's own innocence is not enough to conclusively establish that 
this is really true when the trier of fact could find from the admitted circumstances that something 
more than simplemindedness lay behind the conduct in question." Id. at 1042. 
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Bank One argues in its Brief at page 27 that none of these defenses are available to Herwit 
because they are affirmative defenses that should have been raised by way of answer. Bank One 
contends: "Herwit has raised no affirmative defenses by way of answer. The defenses on which 
Herwit relies in this appeal are affirmative defenses which were waived due to Herwit's failure to 
properly raise them below." Appellee's Brief at 27. 
Again, Bank One's assertions are disingenuous. Herwit's answer to Bank One's complaint 
lists two affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense provides that Bank One failed to join 
an indispensable party, i.e., Aristocrat. See Answer, p. 1 (attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
Aristocrat is the entity responsible for presenting Herwit's check to Bank One. Herwit's answer 
makes patently clear that he has several defenses available against Aristocrat. These defenses are 
also properly applicable to Bank One as well. White & Summers § 14-6 at 52 (Supp. 1993). 
Because these defenses need to be resolved at trial, this Court should reverse the circuit court's 
entry of summary judgment and remand the case for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the decision of 
the circuit court granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is 
inappropriate in this case because appellee has not conclusively demonstrated its status as a holder 
in due course. At this point, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the crucial elements of 
notice and good faith. Any doubts as to whether these elements are met must be resolved in favor 
of appellant. Accordingly, the trial court's decision cannot be affirmed upon this ground. Further, 
Bank One's claim to enforce appellant's check as a mere holder of the instrument is subject to a 
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number of defenses that need to be resolved at trial. This Court should therefore reverse the 
circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Trrant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for Appellant 
Paul Herwit 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing brief to: 
Arnold Richer 
MarkE. Medcalf 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee Bank One 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 15th day of March, 1996. 
Grant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for 
Appellant Paul Herwit 
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Attachments 
H. Delbert Welker (3418) 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: 963-0555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, ; 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant. : 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 950009179 
: Judge: Hutchings 
FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes 
and states the following: 
1. The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park 
City, branch of First Security Bank. 
2. The affiant has personal knowledge of the following 
events. 
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon, Memorial Day Week-
end, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check 
on the account of Paul Herwit, #252 6 in the amount of $9,000.00. 
4. Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to 
cover the check. 
5. On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday, 
Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the 
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day. 
6. I never had a conversation with anyone stating that 
First Security would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check 
was not honored nor has it ever been honored. 
7. As operations manager, I would be aware as to whether 
anyone in our office would have either honored the check or stated 
to any party that the check was honored. I have discussed the 
matter with the Branch Manager. It is against bank policy to honor 
a check received the way Mr. Herwit's was received. Neither the 
branch manager nor me ever honored the foregoing check nor did we 
state to anyone that the check would be honored. In fact, the 
check was dishonored on May 30, 1995 and returned that day to Bank 
One. 
Dated this day of , 1995. 
FRANCEE JOLLEY 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 
, 1995. 
Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Francee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & 
OVERHOLT, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this day of , 1995. 
H. Delbert Welker (3418) 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: 963-0555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant. 
: AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY 
: IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 950009179 
: Judge: Hutchings 
FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes 
and states the following: 
1. The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park 
City, branch of First Security Bank. 
2. The affiant has personal knowledge of the following 
events. 
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon, Memorial Day Week-
end, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check 
on the account of Paul Herwit, #2526 in the amount of $9,000.00. 
4. Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to 
cover the check. 
5. On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday, 
Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the 
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day. To my 
knowledge, check #252 6 has never been paid by First Security Bank. 
Dated this day of , 1995. 
FRANCEE JOLLEY 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 
, 1995. 
Notary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Francee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & 
OVERHOLT, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this day of , 1995. 
H. Delbert Welker (3418) 
3540 South 4000 West, #430 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: 963-0555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BANK ONE, UTAH, National 
Association, fka VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, National 
Association, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL HERWIT, 
Defendant. 
: ANSWER 
: Civil No. 950009179 
Judge: Hutchings 
Defendant, by and through his counsel, responds to 
plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to join an indispensable party. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant answers plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
1. Admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 
3, 5 and 6. 
2. Denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 11, 
13, 16 and 17. 
3. Denies for lack of knowledge the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 14 and 15. 
4. In answering paragraph 7, admits that the check was 
presented to the bank but defendant did not authorize any employee 
of Aristocrat to present the check for payment. Aristocrat and 
defendant were fully advised that the check would not clear. 
Defendant denies all other allegations contained therein. 
5. In answering paragraph 12, denies that the check was 
cashed and affirmatively states that plaintiff was fully advised by 
both Aristocrat and defendant that the check would not clear. 
Dated thiS/^/ day of faZte*^ , 1995. 
jp),/Jf //^ 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Answer to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, 311 South 
State^treet,/#280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this /£ day of 
, 1995. 
^O I/M£ 
